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The suitability of complex financial products for household investors is an 
important issue in light of consumer financial protection. The U.S. Dodd-Frank 
Act, for instance, mandates that distributors check suitability when selling 
structured products to retail investors. However, little empirical evidence exists on 
such transactions. Using data from Hong Kong, we find that investors purchase 8% 
more structured products, on average, when the suitability is not checked. The 
effect of suitability checks is more pronounced for less financially literate 
investors. Moreover, investors tend to buy products with lower risk-adjusted 
returns when product suitability is not checked.  
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Suitability Checks and Household Investments in Structured Products 
 
Abstract 
The suitability of complex financial products for household investors is an 
important issue in light of consumer financial protection. The U.S. Dodd-Frank 
Act, for instance, mandates that distributors check suitability when selling 
structured products to retail investors. However, little empirical evidence exists on 
such transactions. Using data from Hong Kong, we find that investors purchase 8% 
more structured products, on average, when the suitability is not checked. The 
effect of suitability checks is more pronounced for less financially literate 
investors. Moreover, investors tend to buy products with lower risk-adjusted 




Retail structured products are an important yet controversial component of the global 
financial market. Individual investors in the U.S. have suffered multi-billion-dollar losses in 
structured product investments (Wasik (2011)). Consequently, financial regulators worldwide are 
taking stringent measures to protect investors in retail structured product markets. Most notably, 
in the U.S., the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, founded in 2011 as a result of the Dodd-
Frank Act, requires distributors to check the suitability of structured products for retail clients.1 
However, little hard evidence has been produced to justify such regulations, which may not 
achieve the desired goals and could even have unintended consequences (see, e.g., Benmelech 
and Moskowitz (2010)). Given that protection is necessary only when investors are unable to 
“fend for themselves”, it is important to study the actual investment experience. Indeed, 
Campbell, Jackson, Madrian, and Tufano (2011) see “an urgent need” for empirical analyses to 
reveal the cross-sectional variations in financial decision-making using household-level field 
data. 
Structured products are derivatives with a customized payoff structure synthetically 
linked to a reference security or a basket of securities. The retail market for structured products 
has grown rapidly since its inception in the mid-1990s. Global new issuance reached $400 billion 
                                                 
1 Many other countries are also taking similar action. The U.K. is in the process of establishing the Consumer 
Protection and Markets Authority. Norway amended its securities law in February 2008 to effectively ban retail 
structured products. Singapore barred ten firms from selling structured products in September 2009. In June 2011, 
the Financial Services Authority (FSA) of the U.K. (http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp11_11.pdf) and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) of the U.S 
(http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases-/2011/P123744) warned issuers, distributors, and investors about 
retail structured products. 
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in 2007 and the total sales in the U.S. alone reached $54 billion in 2010.2 However, the strong 
demand for structured products from retail investors is perplexing. Henderson and Pearson (2011) 
document that the SPARQS, a popular set of equity-linked structured products in the U.S., have 
negative expected returns on average.3 They conclude that “it is difficult to rationalize their 
purchases by informed rational investors”. Moreover, these products are new and complex, 
therefore not in keeping with the conventional evidence that people prefer familiar assets (Cao, 
Han, Hirshleifer, and Zhang (2011)). Given that structured products have often turned out to be 
risky investments, it is important to understand household investors’ allocation to structured 
products. 
We empirically study household investments in structured products using a unique 
transactions dataset from Hong Kong, where structured product investment has been a 
contentious issue in recent years. Despite the city being praised by Milton Friedman (1997) as 
the best example of a free economy and consistently being ranked first in the Index of Economic 
Freedom, the Hong Kong government took the unprecedented step of pressuring the distributing 
banks to buy back many structured products. Our study focuses on this intriguing episode using 
Hong Kong data. Our findings can also provide useful implications on investor protection in 
other markets. 
                                                 
2 The numbers are from StructuredRetailProducts.com. The total amount of outstanding structured products in the 
retail market was around $1,270 billion in 2007. A survey in January 2011 commissioned by the Financial Times 
reports that 40% of individual investors in the U.K. own structured products 
(http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/25729692-3b8b-11e0-a96d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1P4xvIDoS. Survey results are 
available at https://www.dianomi.com/-uploads/dianomi-investorsurvey-H1-2011.pdf). 
3 The overpricing of retail structured products is also documented by Bergstresser (2008) based on more than 
1,000,000 structured notes issued globally between 1995 and 2008. Stoimenov and Wilkens (2005) and Li and 
Zhang (2011) also find structured products overpriced in Germany and Hong Kong. 
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Our focus is the role of product suitability checks in investment allocations. Given recent 
findings on the overpricing of structured products by Henderson and Pearson (2011), 
understanding the determinants of structured product market participation is an interesting and 
important topic by itself. However, our data does not allow us to investigate investor choice 
between structured products and other investment opportunities. Nevertheless, we believe that 
the allocation data provides us a rare opportunity to explore financial decision-making (prior 
studies often rely on participation data). Our investigation of the suitability check is best linked 
to allocation data.  
Many may sensibly dismiss the potential influence of a suitability check on product 
purchase as investment decisions are commonly believed to be largely determined by investor 
background including financial literacy. However, the suitability check is a key element of the 
newly minted regulations on consumer financial protection concerning important issues such as 
mis-selling (Inderst and Ottaviani (2009)). The Hong Kong market provides a unique setting for 
our empirical research design. For unlisted retail structured products transactions over-the-
counter (OTC), Hong Kong securities regulations stipulate that salespeople check product 
suitability before processing the purchase. Specifically, product distributors are required by the 
Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) to lead an investor through a questionnaire on his or 
her risk profile and compare this with the product's risk level to determine whether the product is 
suitable for the investor. Failing to do so could result in severe penalties. If the product's risk 
level is beyond the investor’s risk tolerance, the investor can still buy the product but he must 
sign an agreement acknowledging that he is taking excessive risk. In practice, the suitability 
check is pro-forma in nature and often not handled rigorously, and some transactions are 
completed without product suitability checks.  We exploit this aspect of the transaction process 
and examine whether the suitability checks have any effect on the subsequent investment 
outcomes, particularly the amount that individuals invest. 
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We compile data on retail structured product transactions through individual face-to-face 
interviews. Comprehensive investor characteristics and transaction procedure information are 
matched to product data. Structured product market participants and non-participants in our 
sample are similar in terms of age and income. We focus on the suitability check effect on 
investment allocation conditioned on participation, as we only observe the status of suitability 
checks for those who have bought structured products. We find that these investors allocate 
about 8% more of their financial wealth to structured products, on average, when the product 
suitability is not checked before purchase. High income earners allocate less proportion to 
structured products. The suitability check effect is robust to controls for investor profile, product 
characteristics, and market conditions. Compared to other explanatory variables examined, the 
suitability check has the strongest explanatory power for structured product investments.  
Product suitability checks were not conducted for about half of our sample transactions 
even though they were required by regulators. It is the salesperson’s responsibility to check for 
product suitability even if investors do not care about this procedure, so it is possible that 
salespeople selectively neglect suitability checks for their own interests. The model of Inderst 
and Ottaviani (2009) suggests some transactions may be completed without suitability checks 
because suitability standards depend on distributors’ compliance costs and sales force incentives. 
We find that suitability checks are skipped more often when the market interest rate is high, 
which is also when the competition for selling is likely high because it is harder to beat other 
investment opportunities. 
One concern is that the suitability check is likely to be endogenous. We use an 
instrumental variable (IV) approach to address the endogeneity concern in suitability checks. Our 
IV is investor’s leverage status or whether the investor is in debt even though he is investing in 
structured products. We show that suitability is less likely to be checked for leveraged investors.  
Moreover, investor leverage status is not a weak IV. Conventional theories suggest that the 
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source of capital should not affect investment allocation. Therefore, it seems valid to exclude the 
investor leverage position from the investment allocation analysis. However, investor leverage 
status can affect investment allocation via the suitability check. Indeed, using this instrumental 
variable in a two-stage analysis, we find that the instrumented suitability check is also 
significantly related to structured product allocation. We further address the endogeneity concern 
using the propensity score matching approach and find that structured product allocation is 
higher when suitability is not checked even for transactions with a high propensity towards 
suitability checks. 
Why is investment allocation to structured products higher when suitability is not 
checked? We suggest that two mechanisms seem to offer the only plausible explanations. The 
first mechanism is learning. If investors learn about product risk during the suitability check, 
then they may buy less after the suitability check. This mechanism is derived from the “neglected 
risks” model of Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012) which predicts that excess purchase of 
structured products is related to buyers’ neglect of bad states. The second mechanism is driven 
by a selling incentive: salespeople deliberately skip the suitability check in order to complete the 
transaction as fast as possible in order to earn more commission. We use investor’s knowledge 
about the products and financial literacy to examine these two mechanisms. Learning from 
suitability checks and a strategic choice by salespeople should have less influence on investors 
who are more financially literate. Our findings are consistent with this conjecture and provide 
support for both mechanisms. The effect of the suitability check on structured product 
investment is more pronounced for less financially literate investors. 
We further find that a suitability check affects the welfare of structured product investors. 
Without product suitability checks, not only do investors buy more structured products, they also 
buy products that have lower risk-adjusted returns. However, those products are likely more 
profitable for the distributors. Therefore, our evidence seems consistent with the theoretical 
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framework of Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) that distributors put their interests before their 
customers. This result on product value is also consistent with the “reverse causality” mechanism 
that a suitability check is intentionally neglected by salespeople to facilitate profitable 
transactions (SEC (2011)).  
Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, the results help us 
understand the “dark side of financial innovation” demonstrated by Henderson and Pearson 
(2011) using data on structured equity products traded on exchanges. Our study complements 
their work by focusing on structured credit products purchased over-the-counter and 
emphasizing the issue of product suitability. Second, we contribute to the growing literature on 
household finance (Campbell (2006)) and consumer finance (Tufano (2009)). This paper is the 
first empirical study, to our knowledge, on household portfolio allocation to structured products 
using field data. We show that a suitability check has a distinct effect, and its effect is most 
pronounced among people with lower financial literacy. Moreover, our findings add context to 
theoretical models on the protection of uninformed investors who rely on the advice of financial 
intermediaries (Carlin and Gervais (2012), Inderst and Ottaviani (2012)).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the structured 
products market and transaction data in Hong Kong. Our main empirical findings on the 
relationship between suitability checks and structured product investments are presented in 
Section 3. We conclude in Section 4. 
 
2. Household Investments in Structured Products: Data from Hong Kong 
2.1. The Retail Structured Product Market in Hong Kong 
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Hong Kong has an active market for derivatives and structured products (the derivative 
warrants turnover became number one in the world in 20034). The size of its retail structured 
products market has increased rapidly, from US$0.6 billion in 2002 to US$44.3 billion in 2007.5 
The issuance of retail structured notes in Hong Kong was regulated less strictly before 
2011. 6  The only oversight was an authorization required from the Securities and Futures 
Commission (SFC) for distributing prospectuses and marketing materials. However, product 
suitability for investors is the SFC’s major concern. The issuing prospectuses of our sample 
structured notes include the following statement: “Under the SFC Code of Conduct, Distributors 
in Hong Kong, as entities licensed by or registered with the SFC, are required to ensure that the 
suitability of the Notes to a prospective investor is reasonable in all circumstances and to ensure 
that the prospective investor understands the nature and risks of investing in the Notes.” To 
check product suitability, salespeople work with the client in person to fill out a questionnaire 
about investor information and product features. 
The suitability check is pro-forma in nature and makes up only part of the many forms 
that investors need to sign. Bank staff collect investor background information for the “Know 
Your Client (KYC)” form and the banks use risk profiling tests to categorize their clients into 
different risk tolerance levels from low to high. Before distributing structured products, the 
banks also assign them risk ratings from low to high. A product is suitable for a customer if its 
risk rating is below or equal to the investor’s risk tolerance level. If the product risk is higher 
than his tolerance, the investor needs to sign an agreement to acknowledge that he is taking 
excessive risk (banks will not be responsible for such conscious unsuitable investments). 
                                                 
4 http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/newsltr/2005/documents/2005-01-12-e.pdf 
5 Data is provided by www.structuredretailproducts.com.  
6 Since June 2011, structured products publicly offered to nonprofessional investors are regulated by the Securities 
and Futures Commission (SFC) of Hong Kong. The SFC now also requires a post-sales cooling off period for 
unlisted retail structured products. 
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Although the distributing banks have internal control policies mandating product 
suitability checks, this procedure is not always adhered to. Many structured products have been 
sold to customers without suitability checks prior to purchase, or to customers whose risk 
tolerance levels were below product risk ratings but without customers’ acknowledgement. 
Salespeople have sometimes provided a make-up suitability check after the transaction. Other 
more outrageous offenses include forged forms and asking clients to sign a blank paper on which 
the forms would be printed in future. These transactions lack proper suitability checks and may 
have been driven by poorly trained or commission focused selling agents. 7  The SFC has 
investigated and uncovered issues regarding the lack of suitability checks.8 
Unlisted retail structured products provide a good setting to study investment decisions 
and the potential effect of a suitability check. Rich information can be recorded during over-the-
counter transactions (by contrast, only price and quantity data are available for exchange listed 
securities transactions). Unlisted products also usually do not have a secondary market and are 
very difficult to liquidate before their maturity date. Therefore, investors are expected to be 
cautious with such investments. Ultimately, whether a suitability check will have any effect or 
not is best answered with field data. 
2.2. Credit-linked Notes (CLN) Structure: An Example 
An important constituent of the unlisted structured product market, and also a majority of 
our sample, is credit-linked notes (CLNs). According to SFC reports by Lee and Chang (2005, 
                                                 
7 Investor oversight does not apply to non-professional investors. Even if investors do not want to have a suitability 
check, salespeople still have a responsibility to follow the proper procedures, as clearly stated in the SFC quote.   
8  See, e.g, http://www.sfc.hk/sfcPressRelease/EN/sfcOpenDocServlet?docno=11PR71 and http://www.sfc.hk/edistribution-
Web/gateway/EN/news-and-announcements/news/enforcement-news/doc?refNo=12PR130. The distributing banks are also 
regulated by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA, the central bank of Hong Kong). The HKMA has taken 
disciplinary actions against bank staff for failing to disclose product risk, see 
http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/press/2009/20091120e3.htm, http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/press/2010/20100514e5.htm 
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2006), CLNs account for about 35% of the unlisted retail structured product market. Lehman 
Brothers Asia arranged the Minibond series which accounted for about 47% of the CLN market. 
DBS Constellation series accounted for about 32% of the CLN market. 
We illustrate in Figure 1 the structure of Minibond Series 35 as an example. (Other 
Minibond series have a very similar structure to Minibond 35.) This CLN was arranged by 
Lehman Brothers Asia for the issuer Pacific International Finance Limited, an SPV incorporated 
in the Cayman Islands, on February 22, 2008 (the offering started on January 16, 2008), and 
distributed through nine commercial banks and two securities firms. The maturity is 3 years but 
the notes are callable at 100% principal value after one year. Annual coupon rates (paid quarterly) 
are 6.0% for tranche A with a US$5,000 denomination and 5.6% for tranche B with a 
HK$40,000 denomination (the HKD is pegged to the USD at about US$1.0 = HK$7.8).  
The payoffs of Minibond 35 are linked to the credit events of 7 reference entities (their 
Moody’s/S&P credit ratings in brackets): HSBC Bank PLC (Aa2/AA-), Hutchison Whampoa 
Limited (A3/A-), MTR Corporation Limited (Aa2/AA), the People’s Republic of China (A1/A), 
Standard Chartered Bank (A3/A), Sun Hung Kai Properties Limited (A1/A) and Swire Pacific 
Limited (A3/A-). Credit events including bankruptcy are defined in the prospectus. When the 
first credit event from those seven reference entities occurs, the notes will be redeemed and the 
maximum redemption value will be determined largely by the recovery rate of the reference 
issues associated with the credit event. Investors are essentially selling insurance against the 
default of any the reference entities. In other words, they are sellers of credit default swaps (CDS) 
for this basket of seven reference entities. The buyer of the CDS for Minibond 35 is the swap 
counterparty Lehman Brothers Special Financing. The structured notes are secured by collaterals 
which are purchased with the issue proceeds. (The collateral asset for Minibond 35 is a 
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) called Beryl 2008-2.) Therefore, besides the expected loss 
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associated with the first-to-default of reference entities, collateral risk and swap counterparty risk 
also affect the redemption value of the notes.  
Minibonds were the first CLNs in Hong Kong. Other notes subsequently entered the 
market, most noticeably Constellation notes, which are similar to Minibonds in structure. One 
major difference is that Minibonds are typically linked to Hong Kong local Chinese names while 
Constellation notes are often linked to established international financial firms. For example, 
Constellation notes 35-37, offered in February 2006, are linked to JPMorgan Chase, Merrill 
Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Prudential, AXA, and Bank of East 
Asia. In particular, many Constellation notes are linked to Lehman Brothers. Constellation notes 
and Minibonds are usually offered in alternate months. Also, there is some heterogeneity in yield 
and maturity between these two CLN series.  
2.3. Data Compilation and Descriptive Statistics 
Compiling household structured product investment data is not always feasible as 
distributors do not share investors’ information with third parties. We took advantage of an 
opportunity created by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, upon which 
individual investors in Hong Kong learned that their investment products were much riskier than 
they thought. For products linked to Lehman Brothers, the risk came from the credit event of 
reference entities. For other products arranged by Lehman Brothers, the risk came from the drop 
in collateral value and the loss from the swap contracts resulting from counterparty default. 
Structured product investors in Hong Kong formed discussion groups to share thoughts and 
information. We collected investor transaction data via individual face-to-face interviews. Our 
interviews were conducted at different times (daytime and evening), different dates (weekdays 
and weekends), and different locations (offices and open areas in both Hong Kong Island and 
Kowloon). Each interview took about 15-30 minutes. In total, eleven rounds of interviews were 
conducted from January to June 2009. 
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Many of our sample investors bought Lehman Brothers related CLNs (Minibonds 
arranged by Lehman Brothers and Constellation notes linked to Lehman Brothers) between 2003 
and 2008. We have detailed product information for such investments and we use them as our 
base sample. We also interviewed investors who invested in structured products where the 
product information was incomplete (some of them bought equity-linked notes). This smaller 
sample is used for auxiliary analysis. Furthermore, we collected data from investors who did not 
buy structured products. This group of investors is used for our market participation analysis. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of our base sample of 221 investors. We aggregate 
all structured product investment at investor level in case of multiple purchases. Investors put 
60.3% of their financial wealth in structured products, on average. The average investor age is 55. 
In terms of education, 48.4% of them have not completed high school. It is conceivable that 
many investors in our sample who are relatively old and little educated may have viewed 
structured products as low-risk bonds, hence, allocated a substantial amount of their wealth to 
those notes.9 
To check the general reliability of our sample, we compare our sample including all 
observations to the Hong Kong By-Census 2006 covering 5.1 million citizens.10 Our sample is 
close to the Hong Kong 2006 Population By-Census in terms of education level (10 years of 
schooling on average) and income (median around HK$17,000 per month). In Figure 2 we plot 
the number of investors in each Minibond series in our sample against the number of investors 
recorded by the Legislative Council of Hong Kong (LegCo). To have a broad coverage for the 
figure, we include all minibond investors surveyed although some did not provide complete 
information (hence cannot be used for our regressions and not included in the base sample). 
These two data series match well, although the average investor profile varies across products. 
                                                 
9 We thank the referee for this point. 
10 http://www.bycensus2006.gov.hk/en/press/index.htm. 
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We also note from untabulated analysis that the dollar amount matches less well than the number 
of investors, suggesting that our data is not biased towards certain types of investors (e.g., 
investors with biggest investments). Moreover, we interviewed 23 investors twice and their 
answers were identical in the two interviews. We acknowledge that we cannot completely rule 
out misreporting. Nevertheless, those results help mitigate our concerns on data 
representativeness and survey accuracy. 
The instances of product suitability checks not being conducted before purchases 
comprise 52% of our sample transactions. We note that the structured product allocation and 
suitability check data are self-reported. The fact that 48% of the investors said that salespeople 
indeed checked the product suitability for their transactions suggests that misreporting of the 
suitability check, if any, is probably not systematic. Any idiosyncratic misreporting may add 
noise to our measurements and go against finding significant results. We also stress that the 
investment decision is multi-dimensional. Investors need to choose the currency, tenor and, most 
importantly, the exact amount in the offered products after the suitability check.  
One caveat of our study is that our findings are conditional on participation in structured 
products. To give our main analysis a context, we explore participation in the structured product 
market using data for both investors and non-investors. As shown in Appendix Table A1, age, 
gender, and marital status are important determinants of structured product participation. Male 
investors are less likely to buy structured products. Moreover, married investors are more likely 
to buy structured products while high income earners are less likely to buy structured products. 
Therefore, married female individuals are most likely to participate in the structured product 
market in our sample. We also find that better educated investors in our sample are less likely to 
invest in structured products. 
 
3. Suitability Checks and Investment Allocation to Structured Products 
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In this section, we first present our main findings on the relationship between suitability 
checks and structured product investments in a baseline regression. We then use the instrumental 
variable (IV) approach and propensity score matching approach to address the endogeneity 
concern in suitability checks. We further provide a robustness check on our main finding using 
an alternative sample. Potential mechanisms for the suitability check effect are discussed with 
the aid of financial literacy data. Lastly, we examine whether investor welfare is related to 
product suitability checks. 
3.1. Baseline Regression Results 
We report our ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results in Table 2. The dependent 
variable is the proportion of household investments in structured products relative to financial 
wealth. The key independent variable is the suitability check variable, Suitability Not Checked, 
which takes the value of one if product suitability is not checked before purchase and zero 
otherwise. Specification 1 shows a univariate relationship between the suitability check and 
investment without any control variables. Investors put 7.9% (p-value=0.028) more into 
structured products when product suitability is not checked. We add investor demographics such 
as age, gender, marital status, and household monthly income in specification 2. The suitability 
check continues to be a significant explanatory variable, and the economic magnitude is not 
impacted much by the control variables. The coefficient estimate for the suitability check is 7.8% 
(p-value=0.03). The only significant demographic explanatory variable for structured product 
investment is household income. Structured product investments decrease by 2.2% for every 
HK$10,000 increase in household monthly income. One standard deviation change in monthly 
income (HK$16,500) is associated with a change of 3.6% in structured product investments. This 
finding is consistent with a recent survey by SIFMA (2010) which finds that wealthier 
households own fewer structured products in the U.S. This structured product investment result 
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is in contrast to the stylized fact that wealthier households are more likely to participate in 
financial markets and hold more stocks (see, e.g., Wachter and Yogo (2010)). 
Investors may chase high-yield products. Specification 3 includes a control variable for 
the product coupon rate. Again, the effect of the suitability check remains significant with a 
coefficient estimate of 8.1% and p-value of 0.024. The product coupon rate does not have a 
significant effect on structured product investment.11 Brand names of distributing banks might 
also influence investment decisions. If the banks have a good reputation, investors may 
implicitly trust products certified by their distributors and buy more. We use the logarithm of 
bank total assets to proxy for distributor reputation. Specification 4 shows that bank size is not 
related to product investment amount. The suitability check is still significant with similar 
magnitude and statistical significance after controlling for bank size. We also consider the 
potential effect of the market investment environment. Outside investment opportunities vary 
with the market interest rate and investors may simply put money in savings accounts when the 
interest rate is high. Using the Hong Kong Interbank Overnight Rate (Hibor) as a control variable, 
we find that structured products investment allocations are not significantly related to the market 
interest rate, as shown in specification 5. Moreover, the suitability check is still significant with 
this control variable. Therefore, the effect of the suitability check on structured products 
investment is robust to controls for other factors characterizing the transactions. 
The magnitude of the suitability check effect ranges from 7.8% to 8.7%. Given the 
average investment of 60.3% in structured products, 12.9% to 14.4% (7.8%/60.3%, 8.7%/60.3%) 
of the demand for structured product can be attributed to a lack of suitability checks. We stress 
that the suitability check is not the only determinant for structured product investment. The 
adjusted R2s in Table 2 are low. This result is consistent with the observation that the household 
                                                 
11  When the coupon rate is too high, investors may be suspicious of products being low risk bonds. This 
consideration could offset investors’ tendency to chase yield. 
15 
investment portfolio is difficult to reconcile with standard theories (Campbell (2006)), although 
it is also possible that some omitted variables may affect the investment allocation to structured 
products. Nevertheless, the stand-alone R2 for the suitability check itself in specification 1 is 
comparable to the R2s in other specifications with control variables. The ratio between adjusted 
R2s in specification 1 and in specification 5 is 0.52, suggesting that the suitability check accounts 
for more than half of total explained variations in investment allocation. Therefore, the suitability 
check has a strong explanatory power relative to other variables for investor demographics, 
product characteristics, distributor size, and market conditions.  
3.2. Endogeneity in the Suitability Check 
A concern in making causal inferences from our baseline result is that the suitability 
check may be endogenous. Why product suitability is checked for some transactions but not for 
other transactions may reflect the strategic choice of salespeople. Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) 
provide a model of suitability standards when salespeople are motivated by commissions and 
may sell unsuitable products to uninformed investors. The main prediction from their model is 
that product distributors may lower the suitability standard when the selling market is more 
competitive and when compliance costs are high. We use a logistic regression to explain the 
suitability check status. The dependent variable is the indicator for neglecting the suitability 
check (“Suitability Not Checked”). Supporting the prediction derived from the model of Inderst 
and Ottaviani (2009), salespeople are more likely to skip the suitability checks in a high interest 
rate environment or when more banks are selling the same product (our proxies for distribution 
competition), as shown in Appendix Table A2. Our findings indicate that salespeople at the 
distributing banks influence the likelihood of product suitability checks. With above 
understanding of suitability checks, we proceed to formally address the endogeneity concerns. 
One form of endogeneity is the omitted variable problem. That is, some omitted variables 
may influence both whether salespeople conduct suitability checks and how much money 
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investors allocate to structured products. Reverse causality is another possibility, as salespeople 
may skip suitability checks in order to sell more products as fast as possible. We use 
instrumental variable and propensity score matching approaches to address the endogeneity 
concerns, mainly the omitted variable issue, in this subsection. In later analysis on the 
mechanisms driving the relationship between the suitability check and structured product 
investment, we will make further inference on the causality.12 
The choice of a proper suitability check is made by the salespeople. Therefore, we look 
for an instrument from the salespeople’s information set. To satisfy the relevance condition, the 
instrument must be correlated with the suitability check. Moreover, the instrument can affect 
structured product investment only via the influence of the suitability check so that it can be 
excluded from investment decisions. We use the leverage status of the investors as the 
instrument variable (IV). The leverage position, that is, whether the investor owes money (other 
than mortgage) to the bank or elsewhere, is predetermined and exogenous to the structured 
product investment. Also, the source of capital should, at least in most theories, not affect the 
allocation of the capital. While it is possible in some hypothetical situation to associate leverage 
with portfolio risk,13 in our sample investors’ allocations to stock and bonds are not different for 
leveraged and unleveraged investors as shown in Appendix Table A3, which also shows that 
leveraged and unleveraged investors are similar in other observable characteristics such as 
                                                 
12 One aspect about the transaction procedure is worth mentioning. Several decisions are made after investors 
express interest in the products. The suitability check is a middle step. As multiple products are available from the 
same offerings, investors will need to choose the currency and tenor of the product they wish to invest in. Most 
importantly, the investment amount will be determined at the end. Salespeople may skip suitability check in order to 
sell more products. Therefore, it is plausible that the suitability check will affect the amount of investment (different 
from zero/one investment choice). 
13 We thank the referee for pointing out that investors can take more risk by either choosing riskier securities (when 
borrowing cost is high), or using leverage, or both. 
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income and education. Therefore, it seems valid to exclude investor leverage from the 
investment allocation analysis.  
Leverage is relevant to suitability checks in the following ways. First, the salespeople 
may take into account the fact that the credit department has already checked the financial 
condition of the investor when he borrows money from the bank. Therefore, the need for another 
check is smaller. Second, prior financial transaction experience such as debt financing may help 
qualify investors to buy structured products, making the pro-forma suitability check less 
necessary. Therefore, we expect a low chance of suitability checks for indebted investors. 
Table 3 reports our two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation results using investor 
leverage status as an instrument for suitability checks. Investor leverage status is an indicator 
variable: it equals one if the investors have a loan from the distributing bank or elsewhere, and 
zero otherwise. The first column shows that investor leverage status is a valid instrument for 
suitability checks, as product suitability is less likely to be checked for leveraged investors. 
Investor leverage status is also the most significant explanatory variable for suitability checks, 
suggesting that it is not a weak IV. 
The second column of Table 3 shows that investment allocation is still significantly 
related to the suitability check instrumented by investor leverage status. (We follow Cohen, 
Frazzinni, and Malloy (2012) to define the instrumented indicator variable to be one if the 
predicted probability is above one-half.) The coefficient estimate for the instrumented suitability 
check, 9.8% (p-value=0.032), is close to our baseline estimation result in Table 2. Our IV results 
support our original finding and are robust to this endogeneity control, although we acknowledge 
that we cannot completely eliminate the endogeneity concern using this approach. 
As an alternative to the instrumental variable approach, we use the propensity score 
matching approach to further address the endogeneity concern on the suitability check. We first 
run a logistic regression to calculate the propensity scores of suitability checks for all investors 
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based on their characteristics: age, gender, income, leverage status, coupon rate, bank size, and 
interest rate. We then pair each observation in the treatment group (Suitability Not Checked=1) 
with one observation from the control group (Suitability Not Checked=0). We note that the 
performance of the propensity score matching analysis depends on the matching between the 
treated and the control observations. Since we cannot exclude the possibility of some unobserved 
investor characteristic driving both suitability not checked and investment in structured products, 
the matching of treated and control group may be imperfect. Therefore, we use multiple 
matching criteria to attenuate the concern that our result is driven by a particular matching 
method.  
Table 4 shows our propensity score matching results. In our first matching based on the 
nearest neighborhood, each observation from the treated group is matched to one or several 
observations from the control group whose propensity score is within the 1% radius distance. 
The result shows that, given the same probability of having suitability checked, the investors 
whose product suitability is not actually checked invest 10.6% more than those whose suitability 
is checked. Moreover, the result becomes stronger (the difference becomes 12.3%) if we require 
more stringent matching (at the 0.5% radius distance). Our second matching method takes into 
account the fact that the matching variables could be correlated. Therefore, a Mahalanobis-metric 
matching is done and the result is similar to the radius matching. The last matching using semi-
parametric kernel matching circumvents the arbitrary choice for criteria and generates a similar 
result. Bootstrapped standard errors show that the differences are statistically significant using all 
four matching methods. 
3.3. Sampling Issue and Results from an Alternative Sample 
The finding that increased investments in structured products are associated with the 
suitability not being checked is conditional on participation as we only observe the status of 
suitability checks for completed transactions. It is possible that some investors decide not to buy 
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structured products after the suitability check. Moreover, the effect of the suitability check may 
be strongest at the margin ― when investors are choosing to invest or not. Our data does not 
allow us to directly test such issues. However, we argue that this data limitation implies that the 
actual relationship between the suitability check and structured product investments is probably 
even stronger for all investors. Specifically, if some investors decide not to buy any structured 
products (investment allocation = 0) after the suitability check (suitability not checked = 0), then 
such data, if we could observe it, would be consistent with and strengthen our findings of smaller 
investments associated with suitability checks. Therefore, this sampling problem will not damage 
our conclusion. 
Another legitimate concern is on the representativeness of our sample, i.e., whether our 
data is a random draw from all structured product investors. Although our initial data diagnosis 
suggests that our base dataset is reasonably reliable, it is conceivable that some investors opt not 
to spend time on this matter when their investments are small, consequently they may not be in 
our sample. Nevertheless, even if investors with small investments do not enter our sample, we 
do not expect an opposite finding for those investors. In untabulated results, we find that the 
relationship between suitability checks and structured product investment is not statistically 
different for small and big investments. In another attempt to show the robustness of our main 
finding, we split our sample by survey time. The majority of our data are collected in March and 
May 2009. We find a consistently significant effect of the suitability check on structured product 
investments in sub-samples as shown in Appendix Table A4. We require complete information 
for all investors to enter our base sample. In Appendix Table A5, we allow different sample sizes 
for our regressions (so the first five specifications have 298 observations instead of 221) and find 
results are robust to sample choices. Moreover, we isolate investors who only made a single 
purchase in Appendix Table A6 and find significant result for this group of investors. 
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We further address data concerns on sampling limitations using an alternative sample. 
We do not include this sample in our baseline regression analysis because product information is 
not available for those observations. Additionally, this alternative sample may be different from 
our base sample in terms of investor characteristics and products. Therefore, this alternative 
sample helps shed light on the generality of our main findings, although we acknowledge that 
this alternative sample is also subject to similar concerns as with our base sample. 
Our alternative sample consists of 77 investors who also purchased structured products 
other than known CLNs. Recall that our main sample consists of two series of CLNs: Minibonds 
and Constellation notes. The drawback of this auxiliary sample is the lack of product information 
which is necessary to differentiate products. The major reason for the lack of product 
information is probably that the product is tailor-made specifically for the investors. Those 
products are mostly equity-linked notes or other equity-linked securities such as “accumulators” 
(a combination of calls and puts with knock-out triggers). There is no public information on them. 
However, we do have detailed information on investor background and transaction processes that 
allow us to redo the baseline analysis. Therefore, this auxiliary dataset provides another 
robustness check on whether our finding on the suitability check is specific to our main sample.  
We regress the investment proportion in structured products on the suitability check 
indicator and other control variables using the alternative sample of 77 observations without 
product information. Regression results are reported in Table 5. Specification 1 shows a 
statistically and economically significant suitability check effect: investors allocate 16.4% (p-
value=0.013) more into structured products when salespeople do not conduct suitability checks 
for the investment. The stand-alone adjusted R2 for the suitability check indicator is 0.067. The 
effect of the suitability check is also robust to various controls in specifications 2 to 4. Suitability 
Not Checked accounts for about half of the explained variations in structured product investment 
in this sample from the comparison of adjusted R2s in specifications 1 and 4 (0.067/0.136). 
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Overall, the findings using this alternative, smaller sample are largely consistent with our 
baseline regression results using the main sample in Table 2. The magnitude of the suitability 
check effect from this alternative sample is comparable to the magnitude from the main sample. 
3.4. Understanding the Mechanisms  
The previous analyses show a robust finding that investors allocate about 8% more 
investments into structured products when salespeople do not conduct product suitability checks 
prior to the transaction. In this section, we explore the potential mechanisms of the suitability 
check effect. We find two plausible mechanisms: investor learning and salesperson’s incentives. 
We use investor information accuracy and financial literacy to test these mechanisms. In our 
empirical design, we exploit potential cross-sectional variations in the effectiveness of investor 
learning and the salesperson’s incentive mechanisms, as some investors are more prone to those 
influences than others. 
Structured products are more complex than plain vanilla securities which individual 
investors understand reasonably well. Household investors may not have complete and correct 
knowledge of the structured products that they purchase. Therefore, learning can be an important 
element. The learning effect is consistent with the “neglected risks” theory of Gennaioli, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (2012). In their model, investors neglect the small-probability worst economic states 
and invest excessively in those structured products with a perceived low risk. This idea of 
neglecting bad states is similar to the conjecture that good states are over-weighted as described 
by Bernard, Boyle, and Gornall (2011).14  
                                                 
14 The idea of neglected risk is related to the salience of risk and the suitability check is in the same spirit of 
reminder effect. Bertrand and Morse (2011) find that more evident disclosure of fees decreases the take-up of 
payday loans. Karlan, McConnell, Mullainathan, and Zinman (2011) show that reminders on future expenditures 
increase savings in their field experiments. 
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The “neglected risks” model seems suitable to explain the observations of the Hong Kong 
structured product market. First, the model assumes that investors prefer safe cash flow. The 
structured products in our sample have constant coupon rates, which are the maximum returns 
that investors expect to receive from their investments, and they are mostly sold through banks 
targeting relatively older investors. Hence, many investors may conceive of those structured 
products as similar to bank deposits. The names of the products (e.g. “Minibond”) may also 
induce investors to perceive them as riskless bonds. Second, the model assumes small 
probabilities for the worst scenarios. The products in our sample have payoffs linked to the 
bankruptcy of a basket of reference names which are well regarded by local people. Bankruptcies 
are low-probability events which individual investors may oftentimes be disposed to neglect. 
With complex products, household investors could be “bearing risk without recognizing that they 
are doing so” (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012, page 454)). Third, the model assumes that 
investors focus on the good scenarios. The product brochures and prospectuses give examples 
that highlight the best scenarios at the front of the publication and worse scenarios further in. 
Consequently, the best scenarios are more salient and come first to the investor’s mind, while the 
worse scenarios are easily overlooked. 
Investors may learn about the product risk during the suitability check process and 
consequently may be less influenced by the neglected risks. Therefore, when product suitability 
is checked, investors are likely to buy fewer structured products. At a glance, our estimate on the 
magnitude of the suitability check effect is quantitatively consistent with the model prediction of 
Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012).15 We also note that, in their model, neglected risk only 
explains part, not all, of investor demand for structured products.  
                                                 
15 According to their model result, the excess demand for structured products due to neglect is the difference in 
returns between a downturn and a recession, adjusted by the risk-free rate. If we assume the return during a 
downturn to be -5% and the return during a recession to be -20%, and the risk free rate to be 3%, then the excess 
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While some investors try to learn the products by themselves, most people completely 
rely on salespeople’s interpretations. Individual investors purchase structured products through 
the distributing banks. The transactions are processed by face-to-face communications between 
the investor and bank salespeople who explain the product characteristics and the purchase 
process. One may be concerned that the suitability check itself does not really matter to 
investment allocation; instead, the salespeople exert substantial influence. In particular, the 
supply side may withhold suitability checks in order to complete bigger purchases. This gives 
rise to the possibility of reverse causality: salespeople want to sell more as soon as possible, but 
suitability checks may hinder sales; therefore, they find ways to skip them. Such selling 
incentives are modeled by Gabaix and Laibson (2006), Inderst and Ottaviani (2009), and Carlin 
(2009). 
We cannot directly measure to what extent investors neglect risks, making it a challenge 
to test the “learning” mechanism. Therefore, our test is indirect and based on the conjecture that 
risks are more likely to be neglected when suitability checks are not specifically conducted. This 
is similar to the “out of sight, out of mind” idea of Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2005) for mutual 
fund investors. Nevertheless, we do have a useful piece of information that makes it feasible to 
test the learning effect. In our sample, many investors claim that the product features were not 
what they had thought at the time of purchase. For example, credit-linked notes are first-to-
default products which will suffer losses when any of the linked names experience a credit event 
(the first event). However, some investors thought that they would have losses only if all linked 
names defaulted. Some investors blame the salespeople for this misunderstanding. In our sample 
with available data, 146 out of 206 investors (70.9%) said that salespeople gave them the wrong 
                                                                                                                                                             
demand for structured products due to neglected risks is ሾሺെ5%ሻ െ ሺെ20%ሻሿ/ሺ1 ൅ 3%ሻ ൌ 14.6% . Given the 
average investment is 60.3% in structured products and the coefficient estimate on the suitability check is about 8%, 
the demand attributable to the lack of a suitability check is about 8%/60.3%=13.3% which is fairly close to 14.6%. 
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knowledge about product characteristics, while only 60 investors said that salespeople explained 
the product characteristics correctly. We find that the suitability check effect is significant and 
similar for both investors blaming mis-interpretation and not blaming mis-interpretation by 
salespeople (Appendix Table A7). 
Prior studies show financial literacy increases financial market participation or the better 
use of financial services (e.g., Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2010); van Rooij, Lusardi, and 
Alessie (2011), Andersen and Nielsen (2011), Cole, Sampson, and Zia (2011)). Investor 
sophistication can moderate the relationship between suitability checks and structured product 
investments. Henderson and Pearson (2011) conclude that “it is difficult to rationalize their 
purchases [of structured products] by informed rational investors”. They suggest that investors’ 
cognitive limitations may explain the demand for overpriced structured products. For instance, 
some investors may not correctly recall the suitability check status (due to unconscious memory 
manipulation). It is possible that salesperson’s skipping the suitability check is correlated with 
investor financial literacy, because people with better financial literacy are arguably better at 
following portfolio optimization rules and are less influenced by other factors.  
We expect the suitability check to have separate effects on structured product investments 
from financial literacy, as the suitability check is transaction-specific. Specifically, we 
hypothesize that financially literate investors are less susceptible to a salesperson’s manipulation. 
Investors with higher financial literacy are more capable of making investment decisions by 
themselves. Suitability checks, as part of the transaction procedure, should affect them less. 
We use education level and numeracy ability to measure financial literacy.16 Education 
and numeracy are the basic background of the investors and can only be obtained over a long 
period of time. The neglect of suitability checks may be affected by experience, decision support 
                                                 
16 See van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011) for a detailed discussion on financial literacy measures. Calvet, 
Campbell, and Sodini (2009) use investment mistakes to measure financial sophistication.  
25 
and advising. We measure education by the level of education recorded in our survey (results are 
similar if we convert the level into number of years of education). The education indicator equals 
one if the investor has high school or above education and zero otherwise. Numeracy is 
measured by an interest rate compounding question which is typical in the literature. If the 
investor can answer the question correctly, we classify him or her as financially literate in the 
sense of financial numeracy.  
We separate our sample by investor education and numeracy and run our baseline 
regression in each subsample. The left portion of Table 6 Panel A shows that the effect of the 
suitability check is significantly positive for investors with a low education but insignificant for 
the high education group. Those educated below high school level invest 12.2% (p-value=0.024) 
more in structured products when salespeople skip product suitability checks for their purchase. 
Structured products investment by highly educated investors can be better explained by the set of 
independent variables than investments by low education investors as seen from the comparison 
of the R2s (0.10 versus 0.04) across education groups. For example, low education investors 
increase investments in structured products when their income is higher, in sharp contrast to the 
negative relationship for the high education group.  
The suitability check effect in high versus low financial numeracy groups is presented in 
the right column of Table 6 Panel A. The effect of suitability checks is statistically significant for 
investors with lower financial numeracy (coefficient 9.2% and p-value=0.035). For high 
financial numeracy people, the effect of lacking suitability checks is marginal. The adjusted R2 
for the high (low) financial literacy group is 0.09 (zero). The results from the financial numeracy 
subsamples are largely consistent with the education subsample analysis results. Therefore, our 
financial literacy subsample results are consistent with our hypothesis that the influence of 
suitability checks is stronger for less financially literate investors. 
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We conduct interaction analysis to show the statistical significance of the difference 
between financial literacy groups in Panel B of Table 6. In specifications 1 and 3, we find that 
the education difference is statistically significance. We also find that people with higher 
financial literacy buy fewer structured products, but the suitability check has a distinct effect on 
structured product investment. Suitability checks, education, and financial numeracy have a 
similar effect on structured product investments in terms of economic magnitude. Our finding is 
consistent with Carlin and Robinson (2012) in that decision support – the suitability check in our 
case – is an important complement to financial literacy. 
3.5. Suitability Checks and Investment Performance 
One important concern for policy makers and investors themselves is whether investors’ 
welfare is adversely affected by not having product suitability checked. It is possible that the 
products are such good deals in terms of risk-return tradeoffs that suitability checks would not 
matter (investors could even benefit from buying more). This “yield chasing” hypothesis would 
predict an insignificant or positive relationship between neglecting suitability checks and risk-
adjusted return.  On the other hand, it is also possible that the distributors intentionally skip 
suitability checks in order to unload hard-to-sell products with unattractive risk-adjusted returns. 
We highlight that structured products are zero-sum games between investors and 
issuers/arrangers; the investor’s loss is the issuer’s gain. Therefore, over-priced products are 
more profitable to issuers and likely distributors who receive more commissions under a profit 
sharing scheme. This “selling for profit” conjecture would imply a negative relationship between 
skipping suitability checks and product net value.  
To test these hypotheses, we need a valuation model for the structured products. While a 
good valuation model of complicated structured products linked to credit risk by itself is worth a 
separate study (see Chen and Sopranzetti (2003) and Wu (2010) for valuation of basket default 
swaps and CLNs) like Henderson and Pearson (2011), we aim to provide a standard and tractable 
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valuation approach. The industry norm for CLN valuation is the Gaussian Copula model.17 Our 
sample CLNs are all first-to-default products. Therefore, the key valuation factors are: (1) 
individual reference entities’ default risk including probability of default (PD) and loss given 
default (LGD); (2) default correlation between reference entities; and (3) collateral losses as 
investors’ capital is used to buy collateral assets. 
Investors receive periodic coupon payments before maturity or credit events. Interim 
coupon interest is not accrued since the last coupon payment date as the prospectus states that 
“notes will cease to bear any interest from the Interest Payment Date immediately preceding the 
occurrence of a Credit Event or an underlying Securities Default Event.” If a credit event occurs, 
then investors will lose money and the redemption amount is determined by the calculation agent. 
Collateral damage affects both investors and counterparties, but the investor is affected slightly 
more because the protection buyer has first claim of the collateral value, and investors are second 
in line. Investors have limited liabilities because when collateral asset value is insufficient to pay 
counterparties, CLN investors will not make up the difference. (Counterparty risk is irrelevant as 
investors, the CDS sellers, already put up the money upfront for full collateralization.) The total 




ൈ ܫሺݐ௜ ൏ minሺ߬௖, ߬ଵሻሻ 
൅ሺߜ௖ െ ߝሻା ൈ ݁ି௥ఛ೎ ൈ ܫሺ߬௖ ൏ minሺ߬ଵ, ݐ்ሻሻ 
൅ሺߜଵ െ ߠ െ ߝሻା ൈ ݁ି௥ఛభ ൈ ܫሺ߬ଵ ൑ minሺ߬௖, ݐ்ሻሻ 
൅݁ି௥௧೅ ൈ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ ൈ ܫሺݐ் ൏ minሺ߬௖, ߬ଵሻሻ 
where c is the coupon rate, ݐ௜ are dates for coupon payments, and T is the product maturity date, 
r is the risk-free discount rate, I is the indicator function, ߬ଵ is the reference entities’ first default 
                                                 
17 We thank the referee for this suggestion. In previous versions we used a parsimonious model to value CLN and 
found similar results. 
28 
time and ߬௖ is the collateral credit event time, ߜଵ is the recovery rate of the first default reference 
entity and ߜ௖ is the collateral asset recovery rate, ߝ is the swap termination value adjustment, and  
ߠ the redemption handling cost. The notes were sold at par. Hence, the net value for investors is 
the difference between the fair value and the par offering price investors paid. 
To implement the above valuation model, we first use the credit default swap (CDS) 
spread to get the market implied risk-neutral default probabilities RNDP = CDS Spread/LGD. 
We find the CDS spread for each reference entity on the offering date from Bloomberg. We use 
CDS spreads that have the same maturity as the CLNs.18 The recovery rate, or LGD data, is from 
S&P’s CDO Evaluator which is the standard tool for practitioners.  
We need correlation data for the Copula implementation. Given that default correlation is 
difficult to pin down, we consider two cases: one with zero default correlations and another with 
default correlations from the CDO Evaluator. We first simulate independent default time. We 
then use the Cholesky Decomposition and Gaussian Copula to generate correlated default time. 
We find negative net value for our entire sample of CLNs (mean=-5.4%, t-stat=-13.99).19 Our 
finding is broadly consistent with Henderson and Pearson (2011) on U.S. equity-linked 
structured products.  
We regress the net value of the CLNs on the suitability check indicator and other control 
variables. Regression results are reported in Table 7. The structured products purchased without 
proper suitability checks have a significantly lower net value. This finding is robust to controls 
                                                 
18  CDS spreads are more common at 5-year maturity but our CLNs usually have different maturities. Linear 
interpolation is used when the exact CDS spread maturity is not available. If the CDS data is unavailable on the 
offering date, the CDS spread from the last observation is used. The CDS data of several reference entities are not 
available from Bloomberg, so we substitute the CDS of a matching firm from the same industry with similar size 
and leverage. 
19 We did not include collateral loss as we do not have collateral information for most of the CLNs. We do not 
expect a systematic variation in expected collateral loss that will give us the result that we find. 
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for investor background, market conditions, and product characteristics. The economic 
magnitude is -1.85% (p-value = 0.051) with zero correlation and -1.84% (p-value = 0.045) with 
standard default correlation. Therefore, investors lose about 1.85% in their investments when 
salespeople do not conduct suitability checks for their purchases.  
Alternative to the CDS-implied risk-neutral default probabilities for CLN valuation, we 
have also used actual default probability from rating history to calculate expected returns. We 
obtain the term structure of default probabilities from Standard and Poor’s Annual Global 
Corporate Default Study (also in CDO Evaluator). We do not find a significant relationship 
between product expected return and the suitability check, suggesting that investors were not 
expecting different returns whether suitability was checked or not for the purchase. Therefore, 
the relationship between the net value and suitability check is not likely to be driven by investors 
going after different products associated with suitability checks. 
The finding of lower risk-adjusted yield associated with suitability not checked is 
consistent with the “selling for profit” hypothesis but not consistent with the “yield chasing” 
hypothesis. Investors would be more likely to buy a product with a lower net value when 
suitability checks were not conducted. This evidence further supports the commission 
incentivized sales mechanism. Moreover, our evidence substantiates the mis-selling discussions 
of Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) that salespeople seek and advise clients based on the prospect of 
high commissions but sacrifice product suitability. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We use a unique dataset from Hong Kong to examine the effect of product suitability 
checks on household investments in unlisted structured products. We find that investors put 
about 8% more of their wealth into structured products when salespeople do not conduct product 
suitability checks before the purchase. Two plausible mechanisms consistent with this finding 
are investor learning during the suitability check process and salespeople skipping suitability 
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checks in order to secure the commission. Our finding that the suitability check effect is more 
pronounced for less financially literate investors supports those mechanisms. Moreover, 
investors tend to buy products with lower risk-adjusted returns when product suitability is not 
checked for their purchases. Therefore, the suitability check has welfare implications for 
structured product investors.  
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Figure 2. Sample Comparison for Minibond Data. This figure plots the number of investors 
for the Minibond credit-linked notes in our surveys versus the number of investors in the 
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Table 1
Summary Statistics of Structured Products Investment Data
This table summarizes our data. Our sample includes information about 221 investors in two best selling credit-linked
notes (CLNs) in Hong Kong issued during 2003-2008: Minibond and Constellation notes. Investor demographics and
transaction data are obtained through face-to-face interviews conducted from January to June 2009. Data on the
two structured products are obtained from the issuing prospectuses available on the website of Hong Kong Securities
and Futures Commission (SFC). Proportion in structured products (%) is the percentage of investment in structured
products to total financial wealth. Suitability not checked is a dummy variable and equals one if the investor did not
take suitability check for purchasing structured products before investing, and zero if took. Leveraged investment is
an indicator for whether the investor is in debt while investing in the product. Reference entity CDS coverage (%)
measures how many names in the product’s reference entity had CDS trading in the year when the structured product
was issued. Bank size is the logarithm of the total asset value of the distributing bank from which the investor purchased
the structured product. Interest rate is measured by 1-year Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rates (HIBOR) at the issuing
month. Blaming misinterpretation is a dummy variable and equals one if the investor alleged that salesperson incorrectly
provided information or did not provide information regarding the payoff structure of structured products, and zero
otherwise.
Variables Mean Median Standard Deviation
Investment decision
Proportion in structured products (%) 60.34 65.00 26.74
Amount in structured products ($million HKD) 0.78 0.50 1.04
Suitability not checked 0.52 1 0.50
Backgrounds of household investors
Age 55.18 58 9.19
Male 0.35 0 0.48
Married 0.90 1 0.30
Income (Monthly by $1,000 HKD) 15.40 10.10 16.58
Leveraged Investment 0.11 0 0.26
Financial literacy and education of household investors
Enrolled in high school 0.51 1 0.50
Can calculate compound interest rate 0.30 0 0.46
Product characteristics
Annual coupon rate (%) 5.26 5.60 1.00
Number of reference entities 6.72 7.00 1.29
Number of distributing banks 11.90 13 2.31
Transaction details
Bank size 5.51 5.90 0.56
Interest rate (HIBOR) on issuing date (%) 2.73 2.84 1.34
Blaming misinterpretation 0.71 1 0.46
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Table 2
Suitability Checks and Investments in Structured Products
This table presents OLS regression results showing the effect of suitability check on investments in structured products.
The dependent variable is Investment Proportion in Structured Products (%), which measures the proportion of total
financial wealth invested in structured products at the time of investment. The independent variables include an
indicator for not taking suitability check before investing in structured products, Suitability not checked, and control
variables including investor demographics and financial background. The p-values are in parentheses.
Independent Dependent Variable: Investment Proportion in Structured Products (%)
Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Suitability not checked 7.904 7.765 8.050 8.155 8.662
(0.028) (0.030) (0.024) (0.023) (0.017)
Age −0.088 −0.095 −0.091 −0.097
(0.653) (0.629) (0.645) (0.622)
Male −4.694 −4.720 −4.652 −4.817
(0.218) (0.215) (0.223) (0.207)
Married −0.586 0.040 0.177 0.376
(0.922) (0.995) (0.977) (0.950)
Income −0.240 −0.255 −0.249 −0.262
(0.027) (0.019) (0.024) (0.018)
Annual coupon rate −2.318 −2.360 −1.789
(0.197) (0.190) (0.335)
Bank size −1.335 −1.242
(0.678) (0.700)
Interest rate (HIBOR) −1.708
(0.222)
Constant 56.226 67.027 79.100 86.175 87.461
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 221 221 221 221 221
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.031 0.034 0.030 0.033
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Table 3
Suitability Checks and Investments in Structured Products:
Instrumental Variable Approach
This table presents two-stage estimation results using Leveraged investment as a instrumental variable for Suitability
not checked. The first stage is a probit regression with Suitability not checked as the dependent variable. The dependent
variable for the second stage is the Investment Proportion in Structured Products (%). Instrumented suitability not
checked equals one if the predicted value in the first stage is above 0.5. The p-values are in parentheses.
Suitability Not Checked Investment Proportion (%)
(Stage 1: Probit) (Stage 2: OLS)

















Pseudo/Adjusted R2 0.018 0.032
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Table 4
Suitability Checks and Investments in Structured Products:
Propensity Score Matching Approach
This table shows the comparison between structured product investments with matched propensity score of suitability
check. Propensity scores of suitability check are obtained from a Logit regression of Suitability not checked on Age,
Male, Married, Income, Levered, Annual coupon rate, Bank size, and Interest Rate (HIBOR). Each observation without
suitability check (the treated group) is matched to one or more observations with same propensity score of suitability
check but with actual suitability check (the control group). Four matching criteria are used. Radius 1% (0.5%) Matched
matches each transaction from the treated group to one or more transactions from the control group if the difference
between their propensity scores of no suitability check is less than 1% (0.5%). Mahal. Distance Matched performs
the Mahalanobis-metric matching, which accounts for the correlation of investor background variables. Epan. Kernel
Matched uses the bias-variance-optimal Epanechnikov kernel to do the matching semi-parametrically. Reported are the
average investment allocation from those groups. The standard errors for the matched samples are the bootstrapped
standard errors with 1000 draws. The p-values are in parentheses.
Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. Z-stat. Matching in Treated Group
(Bootstrap) Matched Obs. Total Obs.
Radius 1% Matched 64.190 53.578 10.612 4.871 2.179 105 115
Radius 0.5% Matched 63.182 50.924 12.258 5.459 2.245 99 115
Mahal. Distance Matched 64.130 52.826 11.304 5.780 1.956 115 115
Epan. Kernel Matched 64.130 54.412 9.719 4.045 2.403 115 115
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Table 5
Suitability Checks and Investments in Structured Products:
Results from an Alternative Sample
This table shows OLS regression results for the suitability check effect on investment decisions using an alternative
sample of investments in structured products. This alternative sample consists of 77 investors who provided all infor-
mation but product names. Therefore, product characteristics are unknown. The dependent variable is the investment
proportion in structured products. The p-values are in parentheses.
Independent Dependent Variable: Investment Proportion in Structured Products (%)
Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Suitability not checked 16.439 19.986 20.701 20.691
(0.013) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Age −0.328 −0.253 −0.244
(0.328) (0.464) (0.477)
Male 0.361 −0.911 −2.644
(0.957) (0.895) (0.704)
Married −1.720 −2.026 −3.348
(0.859) (0.835) (0.731)
Income −0.413 −0.409 −0.434
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Bank size −7.184 −6.731
(0.359) (0.388)
Interest rate (HIBOR) −3.562
(0.184)
Constant 48.788 75.285 109.608 119.931
(0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.006)
Observations 77 77 77 77
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.128 0.126 0.136
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Table 6
Suitability Checks and Investments in Structured Products:
The Role of Investor Financial Literacy
This table presents OLS regression results on the suitability check effect while controlling for investor financial literacy.
The dependent variable is investment proportion in structured products. Panel A shows estimation results using
subsamples divided by investor financial literacy. Panel B includes interaction terms between suitability not checked
and financial literacy (other control variables are compressed to conserve space). Financial literacy is proxied by
education and numeracy. Enrolled in high school, the measure of education, is a dummy variable that equals one if
the investor has high school or above education. Can calculate compound interest rate, the measure for numeracy, is a
dummy variable and equals one if the investor correctly answered the question regarding the calculation of compounding
interest rate. The question is: “Imagine you save HKD10,000 in a bank today and the interest rate for bank deposit is
10% every year. How much would you get after two years of saving in the bank? (A) HKD10,000 (B) HKD10,001-
11,000 (C) HKD11,001-12,000 (D) ≥HKD12,001”. The correct answer for this question is D. The p-values are in
parentheses.
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Table 6 – Continued
Suitability Checks and Investments in Structured Products:
The Role of Investor Financial Literacy
Panel A: Subsample Analysis
Independent Dependent Variable: Investment Proportion in Structured Products (%)
Variables: Enrolled in High School Can Calculate Compound Interest Rate
Yes No Yes No
Suitability not checked 4.032 12.242 11.314 9.198
(0.384) (0.024) (0.088) (0.035)
Age −0.103 −0.233 −0.381 −0.058
(0.673) (0.472) (0.288) (0.806)
Male −4.035 −2.322 −8.542 −2.402
(0.398) (0.688) (0.204) (0.603)
Married −0.608 −0.051 19.871 −3.734
(0.944) (0.995) (0.154) (0.582)
Income −0.441 0.488 −0.401 0.044
(0.000) (0.024) (0.008) (0.795)
Annual coupon rate −3.625 1.989 −5.086 −0.900
(0.131) (0.466) (0.189) (0.681)
Bank size −1.296 −3.408 −1.204 −2.677
(0.754) (0.484) (0.857) (0.468)
Interest rate (HIBOR) −3.181 1.918 −0.809 −1.299
(0.065) (0.385) (0.746) (0.446)
Constant 104.067 70.963 94.911 88.887
(0.001) (0.044) (0.057) (0.001)
Observations 113 108 66 155
Adjusted R2 0.111 0.050 0.098 −0.010
Panel B: Interaction Analysis
Independent Dependent Variable: Investment Proportion in Structured Products (%)
Variables: (1) (2) (3)
Suitability not checked 15.448 11.827 16.840
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Suitability not checked −14.957 −13.319
× Enrolled in high school (0.004) (0.012)
Suitability not checked −10.404 −7.022
× Can calculate compound interest rate (0.056) (0.203)
Constant 93.170 88.452 93.214
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Control for household backgrounds Yes Yes Yes
Control for transaction details Yes Yes Yes
Observations 221 221 221
Adjusted R2 0.066 0.045 0.068
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Table 7
Suitability Checks and Valuation of Chosen Products
This table reports OLS regression results on the suitability check effect on the value of chosen structured products.
The dependent variable is the net value of structured products calculated by the Copula-based Monte Carlo simulation
method described in subsection 3.5. Initial inputs are the credit default swap (CDS) spreads of the reference entities.
Default correlations are assumed to be zero for the first column and according to the data in the S&P CDO Evaluator
4.0 for the second column. The p-values are in parentheses.
Independent Dependent Variable: Net Value of Structured Product
Variables: Zero Default Correlation S&P Default Correlation










Annual coupon rate −0.540 −0.315
(0.354) (0.574)
Bank size −1.967 −1.982
(0.052) (0.042)





Adjusted R2 0.227 0.244
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Additional Tables for Reference (not for publication)
Table A1
Participation in Structured Product Market
This table demonstrates the determinants of investor participation in the structured product market. We run Probit
regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating structured product purchase (one for market
participants and zero for non-participants). The sample consists of 338 participants and 50 non-participants. Data
on non-participants are collected through face-to-face interviews at randomly chosen public locations in Hong Kong in
July 2009. Data on the participants are collected through face-to-face interviews at various occasions between January
and June 2009. The p-values are in parentheses.
Independent Dependent Variable: Participating in Structured Product Market
Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 0.019 0.022 0.013 0.017
(0.025) (0.010) (0.125) (0.066)
Male −0.816 −0.802 −0.820 −0.810
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married 0.528 0.538 0.561 0.580
(0.025) (0.026) (0.018) (0.017)
Income −0.008 −0.010 −0.006 −0.008
(0.036) (0.014) (0.102) (0.040)
Leveraged 0.586 0.624
(0.098) (0.082)
Enroll in high school −0.405 −0.401
(0.054) (0.062)
Constant 0.266 0.028 0.762 0.526
(0.558) (0.952) (0.147) (0.332)
Observations 388 370 387 369
Pseudo R2 0.127 0.140 0.140 0.152
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Table A2
The Determinants of Neglecting Product Suitability Checks
This table shows Probit regression results. The dependent variable is the probability of suitability not checked. Suitability
not checked is a dummy variable and equals one if product suitability was not checked before the purchase, and zero
otherwise. The p-values are in parentheses.
Independent Dependent Variable: Suitability Not Checked
Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Interest rate (HIBOR) 0.184 0.160
(0.007) (0.031)
Annual coupon rate 0.067 −0.020
(0.446) (0.830)
Number of distributing banks 0.079 0.052
(0.041) (0.208)
Socially connected −0.577 −0.497 −0.502 −0.569
(0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004)
Levered 1.032 0.844 0.877 1.027
(0.007) (0.022) (0.020) (0.009)
Above high school=0 0.326 0.285 0.300 0.334
(0.078) (0.117) (0.100) (0.072)
Investment amount (million HKD) 0.015 0.026 0.014 0.010
(0.857) (0.758) (0.869) (0.904)
ln(Age) −0.023 −0.039 0.038 0.023
(0.964) (0.938) (0.941) (0.964)
Male −0.134 −0.145 −0.111 −0.112
(0.479) (0.440) (0.558) (0.555)
Married −0.036 −0.039 −0.082 −0.069
(0.902) (0.896) (0.783) (0.817)
ln(Income) 0.005 0.009 0.006 0.003
(0.821) (0.648) (0.770) (0.878)
Constant −0.383 −0.201 −1.042 −0.986
(0.852) (0.923) (0.624) (0.649)
Observations 221 221 221 221
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.056 0.068 0.084
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Table A3
Comparison of Leveraged and Unleveraged Investors
This table compares the characteristics of structured product investors who are leveraged versus those who are not
leveraged. Leveraged investors are investors who owe money while buying structured products.
All Leveraged Unleveraged Difference p-value
Suitability not checked 0.543 0.614 0.502 0.112 0.056
Age 55.458 55.752 55.295 0.456 0.672
Male 0.367 0.435 0.330 0.105 0.061
Married 0.886 0.913 0.871 0.042 0.253
Income 17.398 18.690 16.687 2.002 0.376
Can calculate compound interest rate 0.346 0.379 0.328 0.052 0.350
Enrolled in high school 0.566 0.590 0.553 0.037 0.516
Stock proportion 5.457 4.855 5.791 −0.936 0.508
Bond proportion 5.599 5.397 5.710 −0.313 0.833
Deposit proportion 28.618 29.685 28.027 1.658 0.624
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Table A4
Suitability Checks and Investments in Structured Products:
Subsample Results by Survey Rounds
This table shows OLS regression results for the suitability check effect on investment allocation using subsamples
collected in different periods. We conducted survey from January 14 to June 16, 2009, with the majority of the data
collected in March and and May of 2009. The dependent variable is the investment proportion in structured products.
Suitability not checked is a dummy variable and equals one if salespeople did not check product suitability before the
purchase, and zero otherwise. The p-values are in parentheses.
Independent Dependent Variable: Investment Proportion in Structured Products (%)
Variables: Survey in March 2009 Survey in May 2009










Annual coupon rate −4.725 0.967
(0.099) (0.738)
Bank size 4.708 −7.026
(0.312) (0.183)





Adjusted R2 0.130 0.046
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Table A5
Suitability Checks and Investments in Structured Products:
Non-fixed Sample Size
This table reports OLS regression results compared to Table 2, only with the sample not required to be balanced. In
each of the regressions, we select observations that have non-missing data on the variables used in that regression,
instead of on all variables that would be used in the 8 regressions. Variable definition is in Table 1. The p-values are
in parentheses.
Independent Dependent Variable: Investment Proportion in Structured Products (%)
Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Suitability not 9.974 10.117 10.024 10.027 10.588 8.050 8.155 8.662
checked (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.024) (0.023) (0.017)
Age −0.146 −0.106 −0.105 −0.130 −0.095 −0.091 −0.097
(0.382) (0.534) (0.539) (0.438) (0.629) (0.645) (0.622)
Male −4.170 −3.900 −3.526 −4.720 −4.652 −4.817
(0.207) (0.244) (0.283) (0.215) (0.223) (0.207)
Married −2.787 −0.676 0.040 0.177 0.376
(0.586) (0.893) (0.995) (0.977) (0.950)
Income −0.293 −0.255 −0.249 −0.262
(0.001) (0.019) (0.024) (0.018)
Annual coupon −2.318 −2.360 −1.789
rate (0.197) (0.190) (0.335)




Constant 54.460 62.517 61.847 64.166 68.167 79.100 86.175 87.461
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 298 298 298 298 298 221 221 221
Adjusted R2 0.030 0.029 0.031 0.029 0.064 0.034 0.030 0.033
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Table A6
Suitability Checks and Investments in Structured Products:
Subsample Results by Multi-time Purchases
This table reports OLS regression results using subsamples based on whether investors have purchased the structured
products for multiple times or only once. For investors who purchased structured products for multiple times, we use
their first-time purchased products for analysis. This is because investors are required to go through the suitability
check only during their first purchases. Moreover, most of the mult-time purchases are due to investors rolling over
their first-time investments. Therefore, the effect of suitability check is more prominent for the (immediate) first-time
purchases than for the (later) rollover purchases. The p-values are in parentheses.
Dependent Variable: Investment Proportion in Structured Products (%)
Independent Purchased Only Once Purchased Multiple Times
Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Suitability not checked 9.270 9.660 10.738 7.076 7.271 9.114
(0.039) (0.032) (0.019) (0.218) (0.205) (0.145)
Age −0.258 −0.219 0.076 0.049
(0.287) (0.369) (0.829) (0.894)
Male −4.096 −4.510 −6.275 −5.969
(0.396) (0.353) (0.290) (0.344)
Married 0.652 1.297 −1.407 −3.688
(0.930) (0.863) (0.881) (0.712)
Income −0.354 −0.340 −0.257 −0.256
(0.064) (0.078) (0.039) (0.056)
Annual coupon rate −2.193 0.664
(0.356) (0.854)
Bank size 0.864 −3.891
(0.827) (0.511)
Interest rate (HIBOR) −1.988 −2.246
(0.252) (0.417)
Constant 52.754 72.338 81.376 62.763 66.660 93.159
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.003) (0.032)
Observations 153 153 153 69 69 69
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.031 0.026 0.008 0.028 -0.001
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Table A7
Suitability Checks and Investments in Structured Products:
Subsample Results by Misinterpretation of Products by Salespeople
This table reports OLS regression results using subsamples based on alleged misrepresentation of structured products by
salespeople. The group for Blaming Misrepresentation includes investors alleging that the salespeople did not provide
critical product information or provided incorrect information. For example, credit-linked notes include credit events
as default of any default of reference entities, but the salespeople may tell the investors that credit event can only be
triggered by default of all reference entities. The p-values are in parentheses.
Dependent Variable: Investment Proportion in Structured Products (%)
Independent Blaming Misinterpretation No Misinterpretation Interaction
Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Suitability not checked 7.436 8.152 13.889 15.118 13.889 16.050
(0.093) (0.060) (0.054) (0.040) (0.049) (0.022)
Age −0.141 −0.042 −0.134
(0.558) (0.912) (0.509)
Male −2.267 −13.751 −4.838
(0.619) (0.097) (0.218)
Married −5.666 26.788 2.636
(0.432) (0.042) (0.674)
Income −0.417 −0.426 −0.362
(0.002) (0.102) (0.003)
Annual coupon rate −0.994 −1.663 −1.369
(0.662) (0.659) (0.480)
Bank size −1.171 −7.771 −3.083
(0.761) (0.272) (0.356)
Interest rate (HIBOR) −3.634 1.711 −1.809
(0.038) (0.526) (0.216)
Blaming misinterpretation 9.861 10.966
(0.117) (0.079)
Suitability not checked −6.453 −7.836
×Blaming misinterpretation (0.437) (0.339)
Constant 57.361 98.612 47.500 81.265 47.500 87.513
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.135) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 146 146 60 60 206 206
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.076 0.046 0.072 0.026 0.064
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